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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of leadership on the level and evolution of pro-social behavior using an 
artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an 
actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on 
the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions.  Authority is measured through a 
social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within the community. I find that giving by a 
pair is higher and shows a lower tendency to decrease over time when a leader is part of a pair. This is 
because higher-ranked pair members in general, and leaders in particular, donate more and are less likely to 
revise contributions downwards after giving more than their counterparts. Leadership effects are stronger 
when moral authority is made salient within the experiment, in line with the ethical nature of the decision 
under study. These findings highlight the importance of identifying different forms of leadership and 
targeting the relevant leaders in projects aimed at local public good provision.  
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1. Introduction 
Public good provision is a crucial element for the functioning of every social group. Social dilemmas, i.e. 
situations in which individuals who would benefit from the provision of the public good find it costly to 
contribute and would prefer to free-ride on others’ contributions, are common in this context and often lead 
to the under-provision of public goods and services. Solutions to social dilemmas relying on governmental 
interventions and privatization are often unfeasible, especially in developing countries, as they require 
prohibitive amounts of resources and institutional capacity. Groups facing social dilemmas must frequently 
rely on informal solutions, designed and managed by users themselves. 
Leadership is a potential solution to many important cooperation problems. Aside from the formal 
authority and sanctioning power often held by leaders, their ability to set an example and urge action can 
potentially mitigate free-riding, coordinate expectations, and otherwise encourage particular behaviors 
among followers. The potential value of leadership is further evident in the fact that most groups, teams and 
organizations function with some kind of leadership structure, even when it holds little or no formal 
authority. This paper examines the role of leadership in promoting the provision of local public goods. In 
particular, it investigates whether leaders’ example can lead to higher aggregate contributions to public 
goods, and sustain cooperation over time. Moreover, this study asks how leaders’ effectiveness depends on 
the type of authority they hold within the group.  
This paper focuses on a particular type of public good, i.e. environmental conservation. 
Environmental problems are of particular interest as social dilemmas, because users have no perfect 
knowledge of the consequences of their resource extraction choices on natural resources’ rates of depletion, 
and this uncertainty reinforces individuals’ tendency to over-exploit them.  Moreover, research on how to 
foster conservation of common property resources can have a large impact on development and poverty 
reduction, as the poor rely heavily on this type of public goods - such as fresh water, pastures and forests - 
for their livelihoods and are severely exposed to environmental shocks. Women and children are most 
vulnerable to under-provision of these resources, the consequences of which they bear in terms of food 
security and time allocation between resource collection and productive activities.   
The fieldwork for this study took place in a rural area of Northern Colombia, where over-
exploitation of local ecosystems has led to the rapid loss of traditional sources of people’s livelihood. 
Participants in the study were asked to make a donation to a biodiversity conservation project. They could 
revise their donation choices after observing the amount given by another participant, with whom they were 
randomly paired. The design of the study varied the leadership status of the person whose choices were 
observed. Leadership was defined through a collective ranking exercise, in which participants were divided 
in three groups - top, medium and bottom - depending on their leadership qualities along different 
dimensions. Using data from the experiment, it is therefore possible to observe how participants’ 
contribution and revision choices varied depending on their own position within the ranking, on the position 
of their experimental partners, and on the dimension of leadership along which relative ranking was defined. 
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The empirical analysis yields the following main results. First, total contribution by a pair is 
significantly higher when the pair includes at least one leader. This difference is driven by the fact that 
leaders contribute more to environmental conservation, and not by the fact that lower-ranked participants 
donate significantly more when paired with leaders. Higher contributions by leaders are a consequence of 
two mechanisms: leaders value environmental conservation more; and the same person donates on average 
more, the higher her relative status within the pair. This result is consistent with previous findings in the 
leadership literature and with the idea that higher-ranked individuals feel a responsibility as role models for 
lower-ranked ones.  
Second, type of authority matters. In particular, aggregate contributions are on average higher when 
leadership is defined along the moral dimension, rather than along the formal one. This result is interpreted 
as evidence of the fact that environmental conservation decisions fall predominantly within the realm of 
ethical norms.  
Third, total contribution by a pair is also more stable over time when the pair includes at least one 
leader. Consistent with experimental studies on public good provision, cooperation in pairs that do not 
include a leader tends to unravel over time, as individuals conform more strongly to others’ choices when 
doing so entails a reduction in giving. The presence of a leader within a pair offsets this tendency, because 
leaders do not reduce giving when exposed to partners who donate less than they do. Once again, this pattern 
results from a general negative correlation between relative status and tendency to conform, which is 
particularly strong among leaders. This finding is consistent with sociological theories of social comparison, 
which claim that individuals look up on the status ladder when determining the appropriateness of their 
conduct. 
This paper makes a series of contributions to the existing literature on leadership and social 
influence. First, the use of an artefactual field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004) makes it possible for this 
study to investigate the effect of leadership on donations to an actual public good. The use of a real world 
sample has shortcomings, first of all the loss of experimental control, but allows to investigate whether 
leadership effects observed in the laboratory with student samples are generalizable and empirically relevant 
in natural and policy relevant settings.  
A second contribution of this research is its focus on existing leaders. Laboratory experiments on 
leadership typically assign status to participants either on the basis of their performance in small tasks within 
the laboratory, or randomly. This approach is chosen because it allows to cleanly evaluate the effect of 
(exogenously assigned) status on behavior. The approach adopted in this paper is complementary, in that it 
makes salient within the experiment the status with which individuals are endowed on the basis of 
characteristics they possess outside of the experiment. In doing so, this study can assess the relationship 
between long term determinants of leadership and individual behavior, and the effect of naturally occurring 
leadership on followers’ choices.  
A third novel element of this paper is its analysis of different dimensions of leadership: formal, moral 
and traditional. Participants within the experiment were ranked according to these three types of authority, so 
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that it is possible to compare the behavior of those classified as leaders and non-leaders according to 
different criteria. Acknowledging the potential role of different types of leadership is particularly relevant in 
developing countries, where formal powers often co-exist with traditional structures of authority. In these 
settings, it is not obvious that rules of conduct established by formal leaders will be the most influential. This 
study is the first attempt at comparing the effect of different forms of leadership in fostering group 
cooperation. Finally, the design of the experiment is such that one can observe how giving evolves over time. 
Existing field studies on the effect that information about others people’s choices has on individuals’ 
decisions to donate to charity typically investigate one-shot decision environments. This study complements 
the findings of this literature and tests their robustness in a dynamic setting. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, an overview of the relevant literature on 
leadership, status and pro-social behavior is presented (Section 2). Then  Section 3 describes the setting and 
main features of the experimental design. Section 4 spells out the main hypotheses that are then tested in the 
empirical analysis (Section 5). A series of robustness checks is conducted in Section 6. The ability of 
different theoretical perspectives to account for the empirical findings is discussed, and evidence is offered in 
favor or against specific explanations (Section 7). A discussion of policy implications, limits to external 
validity and directions for further research concludes (Section 8). 
 
2. Related literature 
Large literatures outside economics investigate the role of high status individuals in general, and leaders 
more specifically, in shaping collective outcomes. In economics, the study of leadership has received 
considerably less explicit attention. A small number of theoretical papers explore leadership in organizations 
(Hermalin, 1998; Komai, et al., 2007), and a growing stream of empirical research attempts to assess whether 
leadership has effects on outcomes such as economic growth (Jones & Olken, 2005), the provision of public 
goods (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004), and firm profitability (Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Other empirical 
papers attempt to identify what characteristics or practices make good leaders (Lazear, 2010). These studies 
carefully document the existence of leadership effects on collective outcomes. This paper complements their 
findings by focusing on one particular form of leadership, i.e. leading-by-example, and by measuring its 
effect directly on followers’ choices, rather than on variables derived from their aggregation – such as 
growth and type of public goods provided.  
Perhaps the greatest attention to leadership in economics has been in the area of experimental 
economics, where a rapidly growing number of papers use simple laboratory experiments to study the 
effectiveness of leadership in the context of voluntary public good games. Some of these experiments 
consider situations in which a leader has private information regarding the benefit obtained by provision of a 
public good (Potters, 2007), as in theoretical models by Hermalin (1998) and Vesterlund (2003). In the 
experiments, informed first-movers are able to influence the behavior of subsequent contributors. Other 
experiments consider situations in which there is no informational asymmetry, to study whether the presence 
of a first-acting leader can influence followers’ contributions and increase public good provision. In general, 
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these studies find that high contributions by leaders induce higher contributions by followers (Moxnes & 
Van der Hejden, 2003; Gächter & Renner, 2003) and nicely demonstrate the role of leaders in overcoming 
free-riding and coordination issues in social dilemmas. Most laboratory experiments induce status randomly, 
using small tasks or manipulating information within the laboratory. This paper takes a complementary 
approach, in that it wishes to explore the effect of already existing leadership on the behavior of leaders and 
followers. Moreover, by making salient the different degrees of authority with which subjects are endowed 
outside the experiment, the present study can focus on longer-term determinants of leadership. 
Field experiments on leadership are rare, as they face the key methodological issue of endogeneity 
between selection into leadership and leader’s performance. Studies that combine laboratory and field 
evidence find that local leaders’ behavior is correlated with community members’ contributions to public 
goods (Beekman et al., 2011; Kosfeld & Rustagi, 2011). Non-experimental studies of community-driven 
development underline the role of local leaders and elites in shaping the outcomes of development projects 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Field studies and experiments on common pool resources show that communication, 
monitoring and sanctioning are effective in enforcing sustainable management systems among user groups 
(Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008), especially when management institutions and their leaders are chosen by 
users themselves (Ostrom, 2002). The present study contributes to these strands of the literature by 
examining what dimensions of authority are associated with leaders’ effectiveness.  
While not explicitly about leadership, two further strands of the literature are close in spirit to this 
study. Theoretical and empirical research on social networks investigates influence within groups as a 
function of  the position, number and type of links that individuals have within the network (Jackson, 2008; 
Padgett and Ansel, 1993). While the empirical analysis in this paper will always control for the number of 
social links of each participant, the focus of the present study is that of investigating the consequences of 
individual status, rather than its sources. Research on charitable giving shares this focus, and features a 
handful of field experiments in which donations are found to increase following the observation of others’ 
contributions, especially if lead donators are high status individuals (e.g., Shang & Croson, 2009; Frey & 
Meyer, 2004; Alpizar & Martinsson, 2010). This paper observes how leaders and followers’ tendency to 
conform to each other’s choices evolves over time, and, by doing so, tests the findings of the charitable 
giving literature within a dynamic decision environment. 
   
3. Setting and design 
3.1. Setting 
A total of 251 individuals from 8 villages took part in the study. The villages are located in different 
municipalities of the province of Monteria, in the Northern Coast of Colombia. They are similar in terms of 
economic and environmental characteristics. Farming and fishing are the main economic activities. Rice, 
maize, yam, beans and plantain are grown across the region. Flooding and droughts are both frequent causes 
of harvest loss. Health posts and primary schools are present in 4 and 6 of the villages respectively. Access to 
other types of infrastructure differs across the sample. In particular, the largest village is reached by paved 
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road and piped water, while the others are not. Regardless of the type of infrastructure, participants from all 
the communities mention contamination of drinking water as a major issue. 
A local farmers’ cooperative, ASPROCIG, acted as entry point to the communities. Representatives 
of ASPROCIG delivered invitations to their fellow community members. Since no show-up fee was paid to 
encourage attendance,
1
 the invitation process followed a series of guidelines in order to reduce selection 
biases. Participants had to live in the village, be at least 18 years old and responsible for financial decisions 
within the household. We invited preferably the household head or the spouse and tried to limit participation 
to 1 person per family. An average of 20 individuals, from a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 27, 
participated to 12 experimental sessions.
2
  
 
3.2.  Design 
Each session involved a ranking exercise, the mapping of the social network, a decision stage and an 
individual survey. An experimenter conducted the session, read out the instructions and answered questions 
from participants. Two assistants helped with the logistics and made sure that participants followed the 
experimental instructions. Sessions took on average three and a half hours. 
 
3.2.1. Ranking participants’ social status  
The ranking exercise was aimed at isolating three dimensions of authority within the village: formal, moral 
and traditional. Formal authority concerns the dimension of social status associated with formal leadership 
roles and political power. Moral authority is related to respect and trust in one’s ethical judgment. Finally, 
traditional authority refers to the qualities that anthropologists associate with leadership among indigenous 
societies in Latin America, e.g. the ability to speak in public and tell stories (Clastres, 1974). Isolating these 
types of authority allows me to assess which one is more relevant for decisions over local common 
resources, and thus to investigate the nature of such decisions in the study setting.  
In order to isolate the different dimensions of authority, participants were presented with three 
hypothetical situations. The starting point for the formal authority ranking was the following: “The mayor 
has accepted to meet representatives from the village to discuss the most serious problems it faces (e.g. roads 
and drinking water). Who among you should go to talk to the mayor?”. The moral authority ranking 
presented participants with the following choice instead: “There is a village member who is harming 
everybody with his behavior (e.g. contaminating the water with waste and chemicals). Who among you 
should go to talk to him about the harm he’s doing to the community?”. Finally, the traditional authority 
ranking was based around a third situation: “There is a municipal fair in which people from all villages are 
invited to tell stories, jokes and sing. Who among you should represent the community at the municipal 
fair?”. 
                                                          
1
 ASPROCIG requested that no show-up fee should be paid. They were afraid that being paid to participate to a 
community meeting, which involved a decision about a common project, may lead people to always expect a private 
return from engaging in public initiatives. 
2
 2 experimental sessions were run in each of the 4 largest villages in the sample. When in the same village, sessions 
took place over two subsequent days. 
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Participants selected their representatives collectively for all rankings. The experimenter invited each 
participant to suggest someone else as representative. For each candidate, the experimenter asked remaining 
participants if  they approved the candidature or not. If no objections were raised, a candidate would stand in 
front of the group, otherwise the experimenter prompted further suggestions. The experimenter solicited 
nominations in the most random and inclusive manner possible. As soon as the number of candidates reached 
one-third of participants, the experimenter interrupted the process. She asked one more time whether 
everyone agreed with the selection or whether more deserving candidates had been left out, and made 
changes according to participants’ answers. This group represented the first choice as village representatives. 
Then the experimenter told participants that this first group would not be able to go to the meeting, and asked 
them to select a second group as substitutes. The process was repeated in a similar fashion for the group of 
substitutes. The experiment assistant recorded the order in which candidates joined the first and second 
group. The remaining one-third of participants went to form a third group. 
The ranking process was conducted three times, once for each hypothetical situation. Their order was 
randomized across sessions.
3
 At the end of the exercise, the experimenter led a group discussion on the 
qualities of top-ranked individuals, for each ranking type, and recorded the answers. Finally, one between the 
formal and the moral authority ranking was randomly drawn to be implemented.
4
 Participants were then 
divided into groups according to it, seated in three different rows and given colored cards to mark their group 
assignment. First choices – members of the top group - received Orange cards; the substitutes – members of 
the middle group - received Blue cards; and the rest - bottom-ranked individuals - received Brown cards. 
Before proceeding to the decision stage, the experimenter reminded everyone of the ranking used to divide 
them into groups by referring to the corresponding hypothetical situation. 
The ranking exercise was aimed at reproducing as closely as possible collective decision-making 
processes that take place during community meetings. This procedure is similar to those commonly 
implemented in participatory wealth rankings (Chambers, 1994). Extensive focus groups, conducted in the 
study area, guided the definition of the hypothetical situations used to identify each type of leaders. While 
the ranking process’ lack of formal decision rules generates a loss of experimental control and makes the 
outcomes of the selection susceptible to being captured by vocal group members, research on deliberation 
processes in group decisions shows that inclusive information acquisition during deliberations yields 
accurate and informative decisions, and that deliberation processes are, under certain conditions, more 
critical for the achievement of such outcomes than decision rules (Lizzeri & Yariv, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the ranking procedure is likely to have induced a series of biases in the resulting 
classifications. By imposing the division of participants to a session in three equally sized groups for each 
hypothetical situation, the ranking created discontinuity in individual status. Individuals above and below the 
threshold were probably similar, but belonged to different status groups. Moreover, the fact that members of 
                                                          
3
 The randomization was between the formal and the moral ranking, while the traditional ranking was always conducted 
second. This choice was motivated by the desire to separate the moral and formal rankings, one of which would be 
implemented in the following stage of the experiment.  
4
 Issues of statistical power forced me to leave out the traditional authority ranking from the draw and focus on the 
dimensions of authority which I expected to be more salient in the study area. 
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the top and middle group had to be nominated by other session participants increases the likelihood that more 
vocal individuals took control of the process and suggested their friends as representatives. The empirical 
analysis will present evidence on the presence of these biases and their effect on leaders and followers’ 
choices. 
 
3.2.2. Network mapping 
After the ranking exercise, the experiment assistants conducted a mapping of the social network. Subjects 
were interviewed individually about their relationship with each of the other session participants. For each 
possible pair (i, j) of participants to a session, therefore , we know whether individual i was a relative, friend, 
acquaintance or stranger to individual j. The social network data will be used in the empirical analysis to 
explore the correlation existing between individuals’ status and the number and status of their social links. 
  
3.2.3. Contribution decision 
Participants to the experiment were asked to take the following basic decision: “Out of an endowment of 
20,000 Pesos, how much to you wish to donate to a biodiversity conservation project?” Participants would 
keep the difference between contribution and endowment. 20,000 Pesos is equal to 10 USD, about one and a 
half times the daily farm laborer’s wage. This basic decision was taken a total of 13 times by each participant 
under different conditions, as explained below. To ensure that all 13 decisions of the session were taken 
seriously, the experimenter made clear to participants that each of them had the same chance of being paid. 
A random draw at the end of the session decided which choice was implemented. 
Participants’ contributions financed the establishment of a tree nursery in a primary school. A 
random draw at the end of the study determined which of the schools serving the sample villages received 
the funds. Tree nurseries help biodiversity conservation in different ways. First, native trees grown there are 
used to reforest endangered ecosystems, such as canal banks, where they prevent soil erosion. Second, these 
ecosystems used to be habitats for endangered animal species, which left following deforestation. Restoring 
them would bring back native fauna in the area. Third, schools use tree nursery to teach environmental 
education to kids. Children learn about native species and how they can help preserve the soil and limit the 
use of chemicals. Finally, everyone in the community can plant trees from the nursery on their own land. 
As mentioned above, the decision stage involved a total of 13 choices, divided across a private 
decision and 4 decision rounds. Participants first took the basic decision in private. The 4 decision rounds 
consisted of 3 choices each. Each choice was still taken individually, but participants were assigned a partner 
and received information about the partner’s ranking, i.e. the color of the group she belonged to. This 
information was given through a colored square - orange, blue or brown – drawn on participants’ decision 
sheets. Pairs changed each round, and nobody had the same partner twice. Table 1 summarizes the structure 
of the decision stage. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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The experimental design varied exogenously pair composition on the basis of participants’ ranking. In round 
1, one possible group combination was randomly drawn to be implemented. In round 2, couples changed by 
drawing a second combination. In round 3 pairs were formed according to the combination still left to 
implement. Finally, in round 4 the color combination of round 1 was repeated with different partners. The 
pair formation process can be illustrated through an example, which is reproduced in Figure 1. In round 1 
each member of the Orange group was paired with one member of the Blue group, while members of the 
Brown group were paired among themselves; in round 2 members of the Orange group were paired with 
members of the Brown group, while participants in the Blue group were paired among themselves; in round 
3, members of the Blue and Brown groups were paired to each other, and members of the Orange group were 
matched among themselves; finally, in round 4, the round 1 combination was repeated. The random draws in 
round 1 and 2 determined the sequence of group combinations implemented.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The design introduced a second variation. Within each round, decisions differed in terms of their 
observability and of the information available on partner’s preferences at the time of choosing, as 
summarized in Table 2. When taking the first decision of the round, participants knew only their partner’s 
ranking, which appeared as a colored square on their decision sheets. They also knew that their choice would 
be shown to their partner and that, in turn, they would observe their partner’s contribution. Before taking the 
second decision, each participant was shown her partner’s contribution in the first decision. Then the 
experimenter asked everyone to write again their contribution choice on the decision sheet, reminding them 
that they were free to choose any contribution amount and that the second decision would also be observed 
by their partners. Finally, before taking the third decision, each participant was shown her partner’s 
contribution in the second decision and asked to make her choice a third time. The third decision differed in 
that participants knew that it would not be observed by their partner. Throughout the round, the experimenter 
reminded participants that they were free to contribute whatever they wished, regardless of their previous 
choices. This process was repeated from the first to the fourth round, for a total of 12 decisions. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Hypotheses 
This section discusses the main hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical analysis, and cites existing 
theoretical and empirical research in support of each hypothesis. The first question that this study aims to 
address is how the presence of a leader affects average contribution by a group. Total contribution by a pair 
may be higher, when at least one leader is part of it, because leaders contribute on average more, because 
lower-ranked participants make on average higher donations when paired with a leader, or because of a 
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combination of these two effects. We, therefore, have to make predictions concerning both leaders and 
lower-ranked participants’ behavior. We expect that leaders will contribute higher amounts to the local 
public good. This prediction is based on the fact that both the formal and the moral rankings define 
leadership in relation to individual concerns for the common good, thus leading to the selection of 
individuals who are likely to have higher valuations of projects benefiting the community. Moreover, 
empirical evidence from laboratory studies on leadership, which find a positive relationship between 
individuals’ relative status and contributions to a common project (Kumru & Vesterlund, 2010), suggests 
that individuals will contribute more when paired with lower-ranked partners than otherwise, and vice versa. 
This evidence is interpreted as indication that higher-ranked individuals are aware of their responsibility and 
influence as role models. Overall, these two mechanisms are expected to have a positive effect on leaders’ 
contributions, and through them on total contribution levels by a pair when leaders are among its members. 
However, such positive effect of leadership may be attenuated by the negative effect of relative status on 
giving by leaders’ partners. The question of which effect will prevail is ultimately an empirical one, that will 
be addressed in the next section. Predictions on contributions by participants when matched with leaders can 
also be made on the basis of signaling theories of altruism (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998). These 
models claim that individuals are more altruistic when observed by others, the more so the more they wish to 
acquire approval from the observers. Based on this perspective, we expect lower-ranked participants to 
donate more when paired with leaders. Existing empirical evidence lead us to anticipate that the positive 
effects of leadership will dominate the negative ones, thus leading to an overall increase in pair composition 
thanks to the presence of a leader. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Pair contribution is higher when leaders are members of a pair.  
 
A second question relating to aggregate contributions to the public good, addressed by this study, concerns 
which dimension of authority is associated with greater effectiveness of leaders. Theoretical and empirical 
studies of motivation crowding, and psychological studies of social comparison support the hypothesis that 
giving will be increased on average by making moral leadership salient. The notion of motivation crowding 
refers to those settings in which individual behavior is driven by social norms or preferences, or feelings of 
moral duty. In such contexts, the introduction of external regulations or incentives can change people's 
perception of the behavior. Voluntary goodwill is turned into a market-like interaction, resulting in fewer 
people willing to act altruistically (Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Götte, 1999). In the field of natural resource 
management, research on motivation crowding finds that the exogenous introduction of regulations, 
monetary sanctions and authorities weakens individuals’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to local public 
goods (Ostrom, 2006; Vatn, 2006). Since contributing to support local biodiversity is not required by any 
formal law in the study setting, this type of decision has a predominantly moral dimension. According to the 
motivation crowding literature, therefore, we expect that participants will on average contribute more under 
the moral than under the formal ranking. Studies on leadership in social psychology support this claim, by 
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showing that the relevance of leaders’ qualities to the decision under consideration increases leaders’ 
legitimacy. We thus predict that moral leaders will be more salient and legitimate sources of authority than 
formal leaders in the context of the experiment, and prompt higher contributions by lower-ranked 
participants. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Moral authority is more effective, i.e. individuals contribute more when moral authority is 
salient within the experiment. 
 
Finally, this study asks how the presence of a leader within a group influences the evolution of contributions 
to the public good. An established result in the experimental literature on public good games is that, in the 
absence of communication or institutions, cooperation tends to unravel over time (Isaac, et al., 1985). This is 
due to the fact that most individuals are ‘conditional cooperators’, i.e. they contribute to the public good as 
long as others do, but withdraw their cooperation as soon as they observe others defecting (Croson, 1999; 
Fischbacher, et al., 2001). The evidence on complementarities across agents in charitable donations, 
mentioned in Section 2, supports the claim that individuals tend to conform to others’ actions. A number of 
mechanisms discussed in the literature on social preferences and learning can account for this empirical 
regularity. Theories of fairness and inequity aversion predict that individuals conform to others’ choices in 
order to minimize payoff inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). According to 
fairness models, positive or negative examples by others trigger contribution change by conditionally 
cooperative individuals (Rabin, 1993; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Levine, 1998). Theories of conformism and 
social norms argue that individuals conform to others’ actions because deviating from standards of behavior 
generates disutility in terms of loss of status or painful emotions (Clark & Oswald, 1998; Lopez-Perez, 
2008). Conformism is also endogenously generated by models of social preferences that introduce envy or 
disutility from deviating from group average behavior in individuals’ utility functions (Bernheim, 1994; 
Maccheroni, et al., 2010). If social status or prestige can be gained through contributions to a public good, 
for instance because giving is perceived as a signal of wealth or altruism, signaling models also predict that 
agents adjust their choices to guarantee themselves status at the minimum cost, given others’ actions 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008; Harbaugh, 1998). Beside 
social preference theories, models of social learning claim that others’ actions influence individual behavior 
because they convey information on the value of the public good (Conlisk, 1980; Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, et al., 1992). Although the goal of this paper is not that of testing alternative theories, in 
Section 7 I will argue that some of these theoretical perspectives appear better suited than others to interpret 
the empirical findings. Here it suffices to say that all these models, together with the empirical evidence on 
conditional cooperation, lead us to expect to observe a general tendency by individuals to conform to each 
other’s choices. 
The likelihood that participants revise their contribution level upon observing others’ decisions will 
depend on their absolute and relative ranking. We base this prediction on psychological theories of upward 
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social comparison.  These studies claim that, in determining the appropriateness of their own behavior, 
individuals compare themselves to others who are believed to possess more knowledge, or fare better, along 
dimensions relevant to the decision under consideration (Suls, et al., 2002). The tendency to conform to 
experts and leaders is found to be increasing in their commitment to group goals (Price & Garland, 1981), 
attractiveness and relevance within the decision setting (Festinger, 1954). Based on this literature, we 
anticipate that individuals’ tendency to conform to others’ choices will be decreasing in their absolute and 
relative status. This prediction is also supported by laboratory experiments in economics, showing that first-
moving leaders who have higher status or are more cooperative themselves induce higher contributions 
among followers, and that high status followers are less likely to conform to low status first-movers (Kumru 
& Vesterlund, 2010; Gächter, et al., 2011). These arguments are behind the third hypothesis that will be 
tested in the next section. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Pair contribution is more stable over time when leaders are members of a pair. 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
The empirical analysis in this section follows a series of steps. First, a descriptive investigation of 
participants’ characteristics and of individual traits correlated with altruism and status is conducted (Section 
5.1). Then the main findings are presented (Section 5.2): giving is higher when leaders are part of pair, 
primarily because leaders give more; this effect is stronger when moral authority is made salient within the 
experiment; and giving decreases less over time when leaders are part of a pair, because leaders only weakly 
adjust contribution downwards after observing other give less.  
 
5.1. Demographic and socioeconomic correlates of status and giving 
Table 3 shows participants’ average characteristics. Their age and education attainments are in line with 
country averages. Almost 40% of them are women. Participants’ average age and gender are consistent with 
the goal of the sampling process of recruiting the head or spouse within each household. The fact that only 
10% of participants had no formal education minimizes concerns that they might not be able to understand 
the experiment. The majority of participants are smallholder farmers, while only 10% of them own livestock. 
Almost 80% of them reports having suffered income losses due to environmental shocks over the previous 
year, mostly flooding, droughts and water contamination. The large share of people who depend on farming 
for their livelihood and who were negatively hit by environmental shocks suggests that participants were 
likely to value the biodiversity conservation project, as reforestation of canal banks with native species 
greatly reduces the incidence of floods. This claim is supported by further survey evidence, showing that 
94% of participants believe that the tree nursery project will be useful to their family. Mean farm size is 
above 2 hectares, and average earnings over the previous week are equal to 35,146 Pesos (17.5 USD). The 
experiment, therefore, endowed participants with a significant amount of money. Data on the number of 
associations in which each participant held leadership roles, such as president, secretary, treasures, was also 
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collected: this figure ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 3 associations with a mean of .33. Each 
person has an average of 3.65 friends or relatives also attending the session. The share of participants who 
are ASPROCIG members (57%) is above that of ASPROCIG members in the study region, a likely 
consequence of the association’s role in the recruitment process. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Participants ranked themselves according to three different criteria, as described in Section 3.2.1. The goal of 
the formal, moral and traditional authority rankings was to isolate corresponding dimensions of authority. 
During the discussion, conducted at the end of the exercise, participants listed the main qualities of top-
ranked individuals for each ranking. A qualitative assessment of the results from the discussion shows that 
the three rankings indeed captured different leadership profiles: individuals at the top of the formal authority 
ranking are active in the life of the community, contribute to solving its problems and have good links with 
municipal authorities; those at the top of the moral authority one are good speakers, diplomatic, morally 
sound, honest and in good relationships with fellow community members; finally, top-ranked individuals in 
the traditional authority classification are joyful, funny, talented, charismatic and full of enthusiasm.
 5
  
The three rankings are correlated but not collinear. 50% of top-ranked individuals in the formal 
ranking are also in the top group in the moral ranking. As shown in Table 4, pairwise correlation between the 
formal and moral ranking is 34.9%, between the formal and traditional ranking is 13%, and between the 
moral and traditional ranking is -14.2%. All correlations are significant at the 10% level. This preliminary 
overview is reassuring of the ability of the three rankings to distinguish between different leadership profiles. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Individual characteristics correlated with the different rankings are explored next. Table 5 shows results from 
the following ordered logit regression: 
 
    (           )                             (1) 
 
where             is 3 if i is in the top group, 2 if she’s in the middle group and 1 if she’s in the bottom 
group,       are session fixed-effects, and     is a vector of individual characteristics: age, gender, marital 
status, household dependency ratio, a dummy equal to 1 if no kids under 12 live in i’s household, education, 
per capita household income over the previous week, number of community associations in which i holds 
leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, and a dummy 
equal to 1 if i is an ASPROCIG member. The regression is run for the formal, moral and traditional rankings 
in Columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Column 4 presents results using average rank as dependent variable.  
                                                          
5
 Table A1 reports, for each ranking, the top five qualities of top group members mentioned. 
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Age and education are positively correlated with status in the formal and moral rankings. Holding 
leadership roles in associations increases the probability of being highly ranked in terms of formal authority. 
The coefficient on being a woman is negative throughout, and significant for moral and average ranking. 
Having friends or relatives among session participants increases the likelihood of occupying a high position 
in the formal and moral ranking. Status in traditional ranking shows a positive and significant correlation 
only with the number of leadership roles one holds, probably due to the fact that public officers are often 
required to speak to community members. Overall, regression results are consistent with the purpose of the 
different rankings. Being educated and occupying positions in community organizations is more relevant for 
formal authority, while age matters more for moral authority. The fact that almost no proxy of 
socioeconomic status is significantly correlated with traditional authority is hardly surprising. The qualitative 
assessment conducted above shows that traditional authority is associated with being funny and enthusiast, 
qualities for which observable proxies are hard to find. Age, gender, education, roles in community 
associations and ASPROCIG membership are significant correlates of average ranking. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Now I explore which characteristics are correlated with giving in the experiment. Table 6 shows results from 
the following regression: 
 
                                 (2) 
 
where     is the same vector of individual variables used above. The dependent variable     is contribution in 
the private decision in Column 1 and average contribution over rounds 1 to 4 in Column 2. Results are 
presented from OLS models for consistency with the specification adopted in the remaining of the section 
(see footnote 6 below).   
ASPROCIG members contribute significantly more throughout the session. This result is consistent 
with ASPROCIG’s mission of pursuing income growth through the protection and enhancement of 
traditional crops and farming techniques. ASPROCIG considers biodiversity conservation as a necessary 
condition for development, not as a constraint, and was therefore in favor of the establishment of tree 
nurseries in the area. The ratio between the number of kids and the number of adults living in a household 
affects contribution negatively, probably through its impact on household needs. However, having no kids is 
negatively correlated with giving, both in private and on average, though only the correlation with private 
donations is significant. This result may reflect the nature of the biodiversity project, which directly benefits 
kids. Having children may also increase people’s concern for the future in general, and environmental 
sustainability in particular (Dupont, 2004).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 15 
 
Note that the coefficients on household income are positive but insignificant throughout, probably because of 
the homogeneity in income levels among participants. The lack of significance of income may be also due to 
noisiness of the proxy used, i.e. income over the week prior to the experiment. A first evidence against this 
statement comes from the observation that the household income variable is positively and significantly 
correlated with respondents’ assessments of their own subjective economic status. Moreover, replacing the 
income variable with asset measures, such as size of land owned, does not change the results. Here and in the 
rest of the analysis, regressions control for household income per capita and not for farm size, because the 
use of the latter variable, while not affecting the results, leads to dropping observations for those participants 
who did not own land or could not estimate precisely the size of their plots. 
 
5.2. Main results 
This subsection presents the main results from the experiment. It first analyzes aggregate giving and finds 
that it is a function of status and type of authority made salient within the experiment. It then explores the 
evolution of giving over time, again showing that contribution revisions differ between leaders and lower-
ranked participants. These findings are consistent with the predictions derived from the literature in Section 
4. 
 
RESULT 1. Pair contribution is higher when leaders are members of a pair. This is due to differences in 
average contribution levels depending on individual absolute and relative status. 
Total contribution by a pair is equal on average to 14, 328 Pesos when at least one member of the 
pair is a leader, and to 12,713 Pesos otherwise. The presence of a leader in a pair, therefore, increases total 
pair contribution by 13% relative to the total amount contributed by pairs where both members are lower-
ranked. This difference is statistically significant, as shown in Table 7, which present results from the 
following regression: 
 
                                           (3) 
 
where      denotes pair p’s total contribution at time t in session s (i.e. the sum of i and j’s contribution, 
where i and j are the members of pair p), and                is equal to 1 if pair p features at least one 
leader at time t. The regression includes session fixed-effects and uses a linear random-effects model (Table 
7). 
6
 
                                                          
6
 In the analysis, I assume the following structure for the error term     :                , where       
depending on whether the outcome variable is at the individual or pair level respectively. The first term models the 
correlation existing between different choices by the same individual (pair). The second term captures the correlation 
between choices of different individuals (pairs) participating to the same session, generated by observable and 
unobservable factors varying across sessions. The third term reflects idiosyncratic variations in the error term. In order 
to control for these different sources of heteroskedasticity, in what follows I will adopt two main empirical models. 
When the regressors of interest are invariant at the individual level (pair), for instance absolute ranking and type of 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The sum of pair members’ contributions is significantly higher when at least one of them is a leader. This 
difference is due to the fact that leaders contribute on average significantly more than lower-ranked 
participants. Table 8 confirms this claim, showing results from the following regression: 
 
                                            (4) 
 
where      denotes the contribution of individual i, taking part in session s, at time t, and          is equal to 
1 if i is in the top group. The regression in Column 1 features i’s leadership status as the only regressor, 
while the one in Column 2 adds the following individual controls    : age, gender, education, number of 
community associations in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that 
i is a friend or relative, and ASPROCIG membership. Comparing the results in Columns 1 and 2, we observe 
that the difference in leaders’ contribution is mainly due to different observable characteristics of leaders and 
lower-ranked participants: in fact, the inclusion of individual controls reduces the size of the coefficient on 
leadership by about 30% and affects its significance level. This finding confirms once again the claim that 
individuals’ positions in the ranking reflect important characteristics within the decision environment under 
consideration, and suggests that differences in contribution levels cannot be simply induced by placing 
individuals in leadership positions, regardless of their qualities. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Unobservable characteristics of leaders may also contribute to determine their higher contributions relative to  
non-leaders. In particular, leaders may have a higher valuation of environmental conservation. The 
qualitative data derived from participants’ discussion of leaders’ characteristics support the idea that top-
ranked individuals, being more committed than others to solving community problems, may also be more 
willing to promote the conservation of common natural resources. Moreover, survey data show that leaders 
are significantly more likely than non-leaders to have engaged in conservation activities over the year prior 
to the experiment, and that 92% of participants believe leaders to be the most knowledgeable people in the 
community about environmental issues.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
ranking made salient within a session, I will adopt a random-effects model, control for observable and unobservable 
factors at the session level using session fixed-effect, and cluster the standard errors at the individual level. When the 
regressions control for time-varying characteristics at the individual level, for instance relative ranking and partner’s 
status, then they will include individual fixed-effects and feature robust standard errors. In order to exploit the 
advantages in terms of efficiency and control allowed by these model specifications, in the remaining of the session I 
show results exclusively from linear regressions. The results are robust to the use of alternative specifications, in 
particular Tobit (contributions are censored at 0 and 20,000 Pesos) and Probit (revision probabilities) models with 
session fixed-effects and observations clustered at the individual level. The regressions do not include round fixed-
effects, unless explicitly stated, because they are never significant. 
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While absolute status per se is not associated with significantly higher contributions, previous 
evidence on leadership suggest that there may be a positive correlation between relative ranking and giving. 
Laboratory studies on social status show that individuals contribute more to public goods when their 
followers are of lower standing than when they are matched with same-status partners (Kumru & Vesterlund, 
2010). This finding is interpreted as a proof that higher-ranked individuals are aware of being role models for 
lower-ranked peers, more so than for same-status ones. In order to test this claim in the setting of the present 
study, I examine participants’ contribution depending on their status relative to that of their partner. Results 
from the following regression offer clean evidence on the positive relationship between relative status and 
giving: 
 
                                           (5) 
 
where               is equal to 1 if i is paired with a lower-ranked partner at time t in session s.  The 
regression includes individual fixed-effects (    ). Table 9 presents regression results. The positive and 
significant coefficients on the higher relative status dummy indicates that the same individual contributes 
significantly more when she is the higher-ranked member of a pair than otherwise.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In order to test whether the effect of relative status is stronger for leaders, I interact the relative ranking 
dummy with variables equal to 1 if individual i is in the top or middle group respectively: 
 
                                                                          
                                                 (6) 
 
Individual controls replace individual fixed-effects in this regression, as we wish to investigate the effect of 
(time invariant) absolute status. Regression results, reported in Table 10, show that both leaders and middle-
ranked participants give more than bottom group members (omitted category). In addition, they confirm that 
higher relative ranking is associated with higher donations. The sum of the coefficients on the leader and 
higher-rank dummies, and on their interaction term, is significantly different from 0 (p=.060), while the 
corresponding sum of coefficients for middle-ranked participants is not (p=.274). However, the former sum 
of coefficients is not significantly different from the latter (p=.296), suggesting that the effect of relative 
status on giving is not significantly stronger among leaders than among middle-ranked participants.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
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The findings presented in Tables 9 and 10 support previous laboratory evidence on individuals’ awareness of 
being role models for their lower-ranked peers, which we find to be equally strong among leaders and 
middle-ranked participants. This mechanism combines with leaders’ higher valuation of the conservation 
project in determining the difference in contribution levels between leaders and other participants.  
On the contrary, contributions by lower-ranked individuals do not significantly vary depending on 
whether they are paired with a leader or not. Table 11 reports results from the following regression, which 
support this claim: 
 
                                                                           
                            (7) 
 
            is equal to 1 if i is in the middle or bottom group, and                  is equal to 1 if i’s 
partner at time t is a leader. Individual controls     are included in the regression only in Column 2. The 
negative coefficients on the two main effects confirm findings from previous regressions, i.e. that giving is 
decreasing in absolute and relative status. Participants give more when paired with a leader, but this effect is 
not significant. The desire to impress leaders by donating high amounts does not appear to significantly 
motivate lower-ranked participants contribution choices. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
To summarize, the first main finding reported in this section is that the presence of a leader in a pair 
increases total pair contribution. This effect is driven by the fact that leaders give more than non-leaders, 
especially if their partners are lower-ranked. Two mechanisms combine to produce this result: first, leaders 
value environmental conservation more than non-leaders; second, there is a general tendency of individuals 
to increase giving when paired with lower-ranked partners. On the contrary, non-leaders do not make 
significantly higher contributions when paired with a leader. These results are consistent with previous 
findings from the experimental literature on leadership and with predictions of social comparison models, 
while they do not suggest the presence of signaling motives behind participants’ choices. 
 
 RESULT 2. Moral authority is more effective, i.e. mean contribution is higher when the moral ranking is 
salient. In particular, leaders and bottom group members contribute significantly more when moral authority 
is salient. 
Next, I examine whether aggregate contribution differs depending on the type of authority made 
salient within a session. Recall that participants ranked themselves across three different dimensions of 
authority – formal, moral and traditional – and that one between the formal and the moral ranking was drawn 
in each session to be implemented. Therefore, each ranking was made salient in half of the sessions and it is 
possible to compare contribution levels across sessions, depending on which ranking was implemented. 
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Average pair contribution is higher when moral ranking is salient. The results from the following 
regression demonstrate this claim: 
 
                                         (8) 
 
            is equal to 1 if moral authority was made salient for pair p in session s. Regression results are 
presented in Table 12, where the dependent variable is total pair contribution at time t  and the regression 
model is GLS estimation of random-effects model with standard errors clustered at the individual level. Total 
giving by a pair is on average 2,400 Pesos higher when the implemented group classification is based on the 
moral authority ranking. 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
This increase masks differences in behavior across status groups depending on ranking applied. Figure 2 
shows average contribution by group, when the moral ranking is salient (dark grey columns) and when the 
formal ranking is salient (light grey columns). Both leaders and bottom group members give significantly 
more under the moral than the formal ranking (p-values of the two-sided t-tests are p=.004 and p=.002 
respectively). Middle group members, on the contrary, contribute more on average when the formal ranking 
is salient (p=.073).  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Insights from theories of motivation crowding and social comparison theories shed some light on these 
contribution patterns. The arguments that follow are based on the observation that in the study setting the 
decision to conserve local biodiversity is a voluntary expression of civic engagement and valuation of the 
environment. Indeed, no formal laws exist to sanction or reward natural resource use, and decisions to 
preserve the environment fall in the realm of ethical rather than legal norms. As discussed in Section 4, the 
literature on motivation crowding supports the prediction that individual motivation to contribute will be 
crowded-in by making the moral dimension of the decision salient, and crowded-out by stressing the role of 
formal authorities. This prediction applies to all status groups. In addition, theories of social comparison 
offer a second reason for lower-ranked individuals to contribute more under the moral than the formal 
authority: if moral leadership is based on attributes perceived to be more salient to the decision under 
consideration than formal leadership, then lower-ranked individuals will be more inclined to match 
contributions by moral than by formal leaders. Indeed, a significantly higher share of participants believe 
leaders to be experts of environmental issues when moral leadership is salient (95%) than when formal 
leadership is salient (89%), and this difference is statistically significant (p=.081). The combination of these 
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two explanations can account for the behavior of leaders and bottom group members, but is inconsistent with 
that of middle group members. 
A tentative explanation for the fact that middle-ranked individuals contribute on average less under 
the moral than the formal ranking relies on insights from psychological theories of counterfactual thinking. 
These theories argue that social comparison processes depend not only on the existing social ranking, but 
also on  the most salient counterfactual for the individual in a specific situation (Medvec et al., 1995). 
According to this literature, people’s emotional responses to events are influenced by their thoughts about 
‘what might have been’. Through an analysis of emotional responses of bronze and silver medalists at the 
Olympics, Medvec et al. (1995) find that bronze medalists tend to be happier than silver medalists. They 
attribute this result to the fact that the most salient counterfactual for silver medalists is winning the gold, 
while for bronze medalists is winning no medals. In the context of this study, if the moral dimension is the 
most relevant to participants’ decisions, the loss of status felt by middle group members relative to leaders 
could be stronger under the moral than formal ranking. In other words, middle-ranked participants may 
perceive their own status as ‘lower than leaders’ status’ more strongly under the moral than under the formal 
ranking. If this were the case, the relationship between relative ranking and giving, established above, would 
account for the difference in average contribution by middle-ranked participants depending on the type of 
authority implemented. 
 To summarize, the second main finding of this study is that average giving is higher when moral 
leadership is salient. In particular, leaders and bottom group members contribute significantly higher 
amounts when the moral ranking is made salient. Theories of motivation crowding and social comparison 
account for these results, given the predominantly moral dimension of the experimental decision. 
 
RESULT 3. Pair contribution is more stable over time when leaders are members of a pair. This is due to 
different tendencies to conform to others’ observed choices depending on individual absolute and relative 
status. 
The first two results presented in this section have focused on aggregate levels of contribution. In 
particular, Result 1 showed that contribution levels are on average higher when pairs feature at least one 
leader. Examining the evolution of giving over time, we observe that contribution levels are also more stable 
when leaders are members of a pair. The following regressions explore contribution trends depending on pair 
composition: 
 
                                                                           (9) 
                                                              
                               (10) 
 
where               was defined above and           denotes the order of decision over time. Regression 
(9) examines the evolution of total pair contribution over the entire course of a session, while regression (10), 
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through the inclusion of round fixed-effects (      ), focuses on contribution trends within each round. 
Regression results are presented in Table 13. 
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
The negative coefficients on the time variable indicates that there is a decreasing trend in contribution over 
time, which is significant within rounds. This result confirms a robust finding in laboratory and field 
experiments on public good contributions: cooperation starts at positive levels, but deteriorates over time. 
The presence of leaders in a pair offsets such downward trend: the interaction term               
          is positive and significant, and the sum of the coefficients on the main effects and interaction 
terms is not significantly different from zero in both regressions (p=.179 and p=.520 respectively).  
 The general downward trend observed among pairs of non-leaders is due to the tendency of 
individuals, on average, to conform to partners decisions. Recall that participants could revise their 
contribution choices after observing those of their partners. We can therefore observe how participants’ 
revision choices in t depend on the relative size of own and partner’s donation in t-1, by regressing the 
direction of contribution change in t relative to t-1 on the sign of the difference between own and partner’s 
contribution in t-1:  
 
           (             )     (             )                (11) 
 
where      is the likelihood of upward revisions in t relative to t-1 [      (           )] in Column 1 of 
Table 14, and of downward revisions [      (           )]] in Column 3.  (             ) is equal to 1 
if i gave more than partner j in t-1, whereas  (             ) is equal to 1 if i gave less than j in t-1. Results 
are shown using a linear probability. All regressions include individual fixed-effects. Regression coefficients 
show that participants tend to increase giving after negative lag relative contributions (             ), and 
decrease it after positive ones (             ). This finding is consistent with field evidence on the 
complementarity between own and others choices in the realm of charitable giving discussed in Sections 2 
and 4.  
 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
The tendency to conform does not explain, alone, the general downward trend in giving. For it to produce 
decreasing levels of aggregate giving, the tendency to conform must be stronger when individuals are 
exposed to lower than to higher contributions than their own. Indeed, we observe that the sign of lag relative 
contribution influences not only the direction, but also the magnitude of contribution revisions. Figure 3 
shows the relationship between the difference between i and j’s donations in t-1 (             ) on the x-
axis, and the size of contribution revision by i (           ) on the y-axis. The regression line appears 
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flatter for negative than for positive lag relative contributions. In fact, participants on average revise 
donations by 2,662 Pesos after contributing more than their partners, and by 2,183 Pesos after contributing 
more. This difference is statistically significant (p=001), meaning that participants tend to conform more to 
others’ choices if conformity requires decreases in donation. Indeed, the mean amount of contribution 
change is -173 Pesos, significantly different from 0. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The different reactions, that leaders and non-leaders have to others’ contributions, lie behind the more stable 
trend in giving by pairs featuring leaders among their members. In particular, leaders are less likely to 
decrease donations after contributing a lower amount than their partners in t-1. This claim is confirmed by 
the following regressions, examining both i’s likelihood to revise giving, and the amount of revisions by i, as 
a function of i being a leader, of i giving more or less than her partner in t-1 and of their interaction. All 
regressions control for i’s contribution in the private decision,           , for the amount donated by i’s 
partner in t-1,       , and for session fixed-effects: 
 
                              (             )              (             ) 
                                                 (12a) 
                              (             )              (             ) 
                                                 (12b) 
 
Regressions (12a) focus on upward revisions following negative lag relative contributions, whereas (12b)  on 
downward revisions following positive ones. Table 15 shows regression results for the amount of upward 
revisions in Column 1 [                       ], for the likelihood of upward revision in Column 2 
[             (           )], for the amount of downward revisions in Column 3 [            
   (           )], and for the likelihood of downward revision in Column 4 [             (     
      )],]. Leaders are significantly less likely to decrease giving when they see their partners donating lower 
amounts, and when they do, they reduce donations by smaller amounts than non-leaders. Leaders do not 
behave differently from non-leaders when they face partners who donated more than they did in t-1. 
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
Consistent with the analysis conducted on contribution levels, I now investigate whether the observed 
differences in leaders’ revision choices are, at least partially, due to a more general effect of relative status on 
the tendency to conform. Results from the following regression are presented in Table 16: 
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                                    (             )                   (             ) 
                                       (13a) 
                                    (             )                   (             ) 
                                       (13b) 
 
The outcome variables are the same as in the previous table. The regressions focus on the effect of varying 
relative status on individuals’ revision amount (Columns 1 and 3) and likelihood of revision (Columns 2 and 
4), by including individual fixed-effects and controlling for a dummy equal to 1 if individual i in session s is 
the highest-ranked member of a pair at time t,              . Relative status is negatively correlated with 
an individual’s tendency to conform, both upwards and downwards. In fact, being the higher-ranked member 
of a pair is associated with a significantly lower likelihood to revise donation upwards following negative lag 
relative contributions, and downwards following positive ones. Equivalently, these findings show that 
individuals are more likely to conform to partners’ choices when the latter have higher status. The results on 
revision amounts go in the same direction, but regression coefficients on the interaction terms are not 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
 
In order to test whether the effect of relative status alone is responsible for the observed differences in 
leaders’ downward revision choices, I run t-tests of the likelihood to decrease donations,  (           ), 
following positive lag relative contributions,  (             ), when i is ranked higher than her partner, 
depending on whether i is in the middle or in the top group. Middle-ranked participants revise giving 
downward 54.5% of the times in such situations, while the corresponding figure for leaders is only 39.3%. 
This difference is statistically significant (p=.008). On the contrary, no significant differences are observed in 
upwards revision choices by leaders and middle group members following negative lag relative contributions 
(p=.564). Consistent with previous results on donation levels, leaders’ behavior appears to be driven by a 
combination of effects. There exist a general tendency by higher-ranked individuals to conform less to 
partners’ choices, which is in line with predictions of upward social comparison models. In addition, leaders 
are even less likely than other higher-ranked participants to lower their contribution to match those of their 
partners’, a fact which could be explained by their higher valuation of the conservation project.    
We observed that lower-ranked members of a pair are more likely to conform to their partners’ 
choices than their higher-ranked counterparts. In order to test whether further differences in revision choices 
by lower-ranked participants exist depending on whether their partners are leaders, I show results from the 
following regressions, which focus exclusively of non-leaders (Table 17):  
 
                                      (             )                      
 (             )                                      (14a) 
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                                      (             )                      
 (             )                                      (14b) 
 
The dependent variables are the same as in the previous tables. As above, regressions control for partner’s 
contribution amount in t-1 and individual fixed-effect, and results are derived using linear probability 
models. After giving less than their partners, participants are more likely to revise their donation upwards if 
partners are leaders than if they are not, and the amount of contribution increase is also higher in this case. 
However, neither effect is statistically significant. Similarly, there are no significant differences in downward 
revision choices depending on partner’s leadership status. 
 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
Non-leaders’ tendency to conform doesn’t significantly differ depending on the type of authority made 
salient within the experiment. In particular, the likelihood that participants revise their donations upwards, 
after observing a higher-ranked partner contribute more, is higher when the moral ranking is salient (49%) 
than when it is not (42.5%), but this difference is not statistically significant (p=.232). 
 This final part of the section has demonstrated that the presence of leaders in a pair makes 
cooperation sustainable through the combination of two mechanisms. Individuals are in general less likely to 
conform to their partners’ choices when they are the higher-ranked members of their pair. Moreover, when 
paired with partners who donate lower amounts, leaders tend to decrease contributions even less frequently 
than other higher-ranked participants. The next section checks whether the results presented so far are 
determined by biases deriving from the ranking procedure used within the experiment.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
The ranking process that was used to divide participants into groups may have introduced biases in the 
attribution of status to participants. This section examines two main potential sources of bias. The first 
concerns the constraint imposed by the procedure, that status groups be equally-sized. The second derives 
from the relationship between leadership and friendship links among session participants. In what follows, I 
will provide evidence that demonstrates how the main results of this paper are not a by-product of the 
ranking procedure used. On the contrary, the classification process may cause an under-estimation of true 
leadership effects. 
 By imposing exogenously that one-third of participants belong to the top group, one-third to the 
middle group and the remaining third to the bottom group, the ranking determined exogenously a 
discontinuity in ranking. It is likely that a ranking process, which left the size of groups unrestricted, would 
result in a different number of participants classified as leaders. In order to investigate whether a 
misalignment between underlying leadership and status within the experiment exists, and what consequences 
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it has on the empirical results, I examine the differences in behavior within groups and near the thresholds 
between status groups.  
 The analysis of within-group differences in contribution is possible because the experimenter 
recorded the exact order in which participants were selected into the top two groups. Since the bottom group 
was defined in a residual way, no within group differences can be defined there. For the top and middle 
groups, therefore, we can explore whether individuals selected early on into the group behave differently 
than fellow group members nominated later. A simple distinction is between the first half of participants 
selected into the group and the remaining members of the same group. Figure 4 shows mean contribution of 
participants by absolute status, distinguishing between the top and the bottom half of each group. Focusing 
on the top group, we observe that those selected first as leaders give significantly more than those selected 
last (p=.013). The middle group displays an opposite pattern, i.e. the lower-ranked components of the group 
contribute on average significantly more than the higher-ranked ones (p=.002).  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Within group differences in behavior can result from the fact that the qualities related with leadership are 
stronger among the individuals nominated first, and progressively get diluted as we move down the ranking. 
Since intrinsic valuation of local public goods is a prominent quality of leaders according to qualitative and 
survey data, this would explain the fact that ‘top leaders’ donate more to environmental conservation than all 
lower-ranked participants.  Indeed, once we control for observable characteristics of participants, the 
differences in giving between top and bottom-ranked members of a group lose significance, as shown by the 
results of the following regression:  
 
                                                 (15) 
 
where                is equal to 1 if i is in the top half of her group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 of Table 
18 considers top group members only, while Column 2 focuses on members of the middle group. Regression 
results tells us that within group differences in giving are primarily driven by individual characteristics 
correlated with ranking order. Although not significant, the negative coefficients on the                 
dummies suggest that giving by lower-ranked members of a group is higher than that by their fellow group 
members, once their individual characteristics are controlled for. This result is consistent with psychological 
theories of counterfactual thinking. According to this perspective, for lowest-ranked individuals within a 
group the most salient counterfactual is represented by members of the lower status group (because they 
could have easily ended there). Their behavior would therefore be driven by a feeling of being role models 
for those ranked below, rather than by a feeling of relative deprivation for not having reached higher 
positions in the ranking. The positive correlation existing between relative ranking and giving, found in the 
previous section (Result 1), further supports this argument. 
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[Insert Table 18 here] 
 
The differences in contribution levels between participants in the lower half of the top group and those in the 
upper half of the middle group, significant when we run a simple t-test (p=.002), also lose significance once 
we control for individuals characteristics. A similar regression to (15) is run, focusing this time only on 
participants around the status threshold between top and middle group: 
 
                                                      (16) 
 
where                      is equal to 1 if i is in the top half of the middle group and to 0 if i is in the 
bottom half of the top group. The results, presented in Table 19, show that there is no statistically significant 
difference in contribution between the lowest-ranked among the leaders and the highest-ranked within the 
middle group, once we control for individual characteristics. This finding further reassures us of the ability 
of the ranking to reflect actual differences in individual characteristics.  
 
[Insert Table 19 here] 
 
The presence of within-group differences in giving has relevant implications, especially in terms of 
leadership effects. If the ranking process led to the inclusion of individuals with progressively weaker 
leadership profiles into the top group, then the leadership effects observed here are lower bounds of what we 
would observe, had the selection into the leaders’ group been restricted to fewer individuals.  
 I now turn to examining the second potential source of bias generated by the ranking process. By 
accepting as candidates in the top two groups only those nominated by fellow session participants, the 
ranking may have induced the selection of leaders on the basis of friendship networks rather than individual 
qualities. If this were the case, the fact that leaders do not adjust their contributions to match lower ones by 
non-leaders, while non-leaders revise giving upwards in order to conform to leaders, could be a consequence 
of the effect of friendship on influence. This outcome would result if individuals were more inclined to 
conform to the choices of friends than of strangers, if those, whom leaders consider friends, belonged to their 
own group, and if, concurrently, lower-ranked participants had more friends in the top group than in other 
groups. Table 20 shows average number of friends by status group among leaders and non-leaders. Overall, 
leaders say to have fewer friends also attending the session than non-leaders. This difference is mainly due to 
the smaller number of friends that leaders declare to have among lower-ranked participants, relative to non-
leaders. The difference between leaders and non-leaders in the number of top-ranked friends mentioned is 
also small and not significant.  
 
[Insert Table 20 here] 
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Table 20 shows that leaders do not appear to have significantly fewer friends among non-leaders than lower-
ranked participants, and that non-leaders have only slightly more friends among leaders than top-ranked 
participants. This is preliminary evidence against the possibility that experimental results be driven by status-
specific network differences. Still, we wish to check whether differences in friendship relationships can 
account for the differences we observe in contributions depending on absolute and relative status. If 
individuals contribute to the conservation project because it can be beneficial to their friends, the more so the 
needier their friends are, then giving should be increasing in the number of lower-ranked friends. Moreover, 
if donations are believed to please friends who will benefit from them, then we expect giving to respond to 
partner’s group, depending on the number of friends one has in that group. I test these predictions through 
the following regressions: 
 
                                                      
                                                    (18a) 
                                                                                 
                                                              
                                                                                        (18b) 
 
where (18a) examines how contribution by individual i at time t depends on the number of friends i has 
among leaders (               ) and non-leaders (                  ), controlling for contribution in 
the private decision, partner’s donation in t-1, individual characteristics (including absolute status) and 
session fixed-effects. Regression formula (18b) adds to these variables dummies equal to 1 if i’s partner at 
time t is a leader (                ), and interaction terms between partner’s status and number of friends i 
has in the corresponding status category (                                 and 
                                     ). The constant in (18b) captures average contribution when i’s 
partner is not a leader, and regression coefficients reflect deviations from this baseline contribution level. 
 Table 21 shows results from (18a) in Column 1 and from (18b) in Column 2. The number of friends 
among leaders and non-leaders does not appear to significantly affect contributions, nor does the interaction 
between partner’s status and number of friends i has in the corresponding status group. These findings 
demonstrate that leadership effects are not driven by the influence of friendship networks on status and 
giving. 
 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
 
Overall, the results presented in this section reassure us of the ability of ranking within the experiment to 
reflect leadership status within the community, and mitigate concerns that leadership effects observed here 
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may be a by-product of the specific ranking procedure used. On the contrary, the ranking process, by 
assigning leadership status to as many as one-third of participants, may have attenuated its effects. 
 
7. Mechanisms 
This section reviews the experimental results with the purpose of interpreting them in light of existing 
theories of social preferences, learning and social comparison. In the course of the analysis, evidence in 
support or against specific perspectives will be offered. This section is not meant to offer an exhaustive 
account of all theoretical perspectives that can account for the empirical results presented so far. The goal of 
this review is simply to focus on specific theoretical frameworks and discuss their consistency with the 
experimental data. 
A common framework used in economics to explain social influence is offered by models of learning 
(Conlisk, 1980; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Under this perspectives, individuals conform 
because others’ choices convey information about the value of alternative outcomes under consideration. The 
heterogeneity in the tendency to conform that we observe between leaders and non-leaders can be explained 
by assuming that information conveyed by leaders’ choices is more valuable, and thus individuals conform 
more to the actions of leaders than of lower-ranked peers. If learning were the only mechanism at work, we 
would observe a decreasing marginal effect of information, reflected in the likelihood that observing others’ 
choices induces individuals to revise their own. Observing a decreasing frequency of revisions over time 
would, therefore, be evidence of the role of learning within the experiment. The frequency of revisions is 
77.8%, 77.1%, 78.1% and 79.1% in the first, second, third and fourth round respectively. Rather than 
decreasing, the frequency of revisions increases over time, which is evidence against the presence of 
powerful learning effects within the experiment.  
Signaling theories of altruism also predict a positive correlation between own and others’ 
contribution, stronger when the latter are of higher status (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998). 
According to these models, agents’ pro-social behavior is motivated by the desire to gain approval from their 
peers. Such desire is stronger the more respected their peers are. In the setting of this study, these 
assumptions imply that low status participants contribute to the public good in order to impress their high 
status partners. Upon observing their high-ranked counterparts contribute less than they did, and realizing 
that approval could be bought more cheaply, they reduce their donations. The same framework predicts the 
low tendency to conform to the choices of lower-ranked partners on the part of leaders. The role of giving as 
a signal of desirable qualities to others depends on the fact that contribution choices are observable. When 
they are not, the signaling motive to contribute disappears. In order to test whether this motive is at work 
within the experiment, individual contributions are compared depending on whether they are observable or 
not. Table 22 shows results from the following regressions: 
 
                                                            (19a) 
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                                                   (19b) 
 
where (19a) regresses i’s contribution at time t on whether the choice was observed, partner’s contribution at 
t-1 and individual fixed-effects (Column 1), while (19b) tests whether the effect of observability depends on 
i’s partner being a leader (Column 2). Regression results show that contribution amounts are not significantly 
higher depending on whether choice is observed or not. The status of the partner also doesn’t matter. These 
findings are inconsistent with the presence of signaling motives behind participants’ choices. However, 
signaling models claim that individuals care about projecting a good image not just to others, but also to 
themselves (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Unfortunately the available data does not allow testing whether self-
signaling motives are relevant within the experiment. 
 
[Insert Table 22 here] 
 
Theories of inequity aversion make predictions consistent with the empirical findings of this study: after 
observing others’ contribution amounts, individuals revise their choices so as to minimize payoff inequality. 
Moreover, these models assume that agents are more averse to disadvantageous inequality, and thus more 
likely to reduce giving after learning that their partners earned more, than to increase it after learning that 
their partners earned less. Although no formal test exists of whether inequity aversion is at work within the 
experiment, a remark can be made. According to inequity aversion theory, we would expect revisions 
choices by bottom group members to be correlated with the perceived income of top-ranked individuals: if 
top group members are believed to be the richest in the community, then by earning more than others 
through the experiment they would further increase inequality. Inequality would be reduced instead if leaders 
were believed to be the poorest in the community. In the survey, participants were asked if they thought that 
top group members were among the richest people in the community. Only 24% of bottom-ranked 
participants answered affirmatively to this question. Moreover, the probability that low status participants 
decrease giving in t after learning that their top-ranked partners gave less than they did in t-1, is not 
correlated with the belief that top-ranked partners are rich.  
 As for reciprocity models, the asymmetry we observe in revision patterns is consistent with what 
Charness and Rabin (2002) call ‘concern withdrawal’: individuals do not display strong positive reciprocity, 
but are quick to withdraw their concern for other agents’ wellbeing when the latter act uncooperatively. This 
theoretical framework can account for the fact that participants to the experiment tend to revise giving 
downwards more than upwards, and for the absence of effects of observability.  
In order to explain why the tendency to conform to others’ actions is negatively correlated with 
individuals absolute and relative ranking, all theories reviewed so far need to be combined with models of 
social comparison, which argue that agents look upwards on the status ladder when assessing their own 
behavior. Survey data confirm that participants’ opinions on their own ability to influence others depend on 
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status: asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 4 - where 1 is ‘very’ and 4 is ‘not at all’- how much influence they 
had on community outcomes, leaders and non-leaders’ mean answers were on average 1.4 and 1.7 
respectively. Such difference is statistically significant (p=.011), even more so if we focus on moral leaders 
(p=.006), whose answer was 1.3 on average.
7
 
The only models that do not require to be complemented by social comparison theories, in order to 
account for the different behavioral patterns that we observe in the data, are social norms and conformity 
models. There, the asymmetry between upward and downward revision amounts results from that between 
honor from complying with the norm and shame from deviating from it. Moreover, the presence of 
differences in honor and stigma depending on individual status would justify the different revision patters by 
leaders and non-leaders. Honor from complying could be decreasing in status, thus explaining lower-ranked 
willingness to revise contributions upwards upon observing higher-ranked partners donate more. On the 
other hand, the shame from not contributing could be increasing in status, which would  explain why leaders 
fail to conform to lower-ranked partners who contribute lower amounts. The presence of context-dependent 
social norms has been demonstrated by empirical studies (Krupka & Weber, 2010), showing how people’s 
opinions on what is appropriate behavior are strongly dependent on the decision environment. Since 
differences across, and within, groups enter the definition of participants’ choice environment in the setting 
of this study, theories of social norms would predict them to be associated with heterogeneities in individual 
behavior. 
To summarize, among social preference theories, some appear to perform better than others in 
explaining the main empirical findings of this study. In particular, theories of conformism and social norms, 
and a combination of reciprocity and social comparison models appear to be capable of explaining the larger 
set of empirical findings from this study. This is, of course, no conclusive evidence in favor of one 
perspective over others. On the contrary, different mechanisms may combine to produce observed behavior. 
Further experiments would be needed to formally test the predictive power of the different theories reviewed 
in this section. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Through a novel methodological approach, combining a participatory ranking exercise, which identified 
different types of existing leaders within the community, and a public-good game, in which participants 
contributed to an actual biodiversity conservation project, this paper has shown that the presence of leaders is 
associated with higher and more stable contributions by the group over time. First, leaders give more, and 
this by itself makes total pair contribution significantly higher when leaders are part of it. Second, top-ranked 
individuals show a low tendency to conform to (lower) partners’ contribution. These results are driven by the 
                                                          
7
 While social comparison theories can account for leadership effects in giving and revision choices, they cannot 
explain the fact that bottom-ranked participants within a group contribute more than top-ranked members of the same 
group. We noted that theories of counterfactual thinking can explain why participants, who just missed-out being in a 
lower group, tend to compare themselves primarily to lower-ranked peers and feel the responsibility of being role 
models for them, much in the same way as leaders feel towards non-leaders. While interesting, this effect is not 
significant once individual characteristics are controlled for. 
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combination of leaders’ high valuation of the local public good provided through their donations, and of a 
general positive relationship between relative status and giving, both on average and over time. These effects 
are enhanced when leadership is defined along a dimension that is relevant for the decision under 
consideration. The results also show that, beyond the general relationship between relative status and 
behavior, non-leaders’ actions do not significantly vary depending on whether their partners are leaders. 
It is an established fact in sociology and economics that innovation processes take off when opinion 
leaders and highly connected individuals decide to adopt (Rogers, 1962; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In 
practice, identifying these key individuals in unfamiliar settings may be challenging and costly. This study 
presents a solution to the targeting problems, by demonstrating how a simple ranking exercise can help 
identify natural leaders within a community. The empirical results presented here suggest that the identity of 
effective leaders depends on the nature of the decision under consideration. For leaders to feel responsibility 
as role models, it is therefore crucial that they are selected on the basis of characteristics salient to the 
specific issue at hand. Once these conditions are fulfilled, this study suggests that interventions targeted to 
local leaders, for instance environmental education programs, may have a significant impact on the broader 
community.  
The results from this study go against conventional wisdom in development economics. The 
literature on community driven development warns against the risk of elite capture of development programs 
and looks at the power of local elites as a negative factor. I show instead that elites can play a positive role. 
This result may depend on the way leaders are selected within the experiment or on other social and cultural 
features of the study area. Indeed, the ranking process provided legitimacy to leaders in the context of the 
experiment. Testing the robustness of the experimental findings to leaders’ selection process and 
characteristics could be an interesting direction for further research. 
Generalizability of the results could be interestingly explored along two other dimensions, which 
would address limitations of this study. First, the positive role played by local leaders in the experiment may 
depend on specific features of the experimental design. In particular, before deciding how much to 
contribute, participants discussed the qualities of top group members for each ranking. By spelling out what 
was expected of them, this discussion may have influenced top group members’ behavior. The notion that 
placing responsibility for the common good in the hands of local elites could have a positive effect on their 
conduct has great policy relevance and would deserve further empirical testing.  
Second, this study shows that social status affects choices when individuals face a decision with a 
strong normative content. The ‘right’ choice there depends more on ethical concerns than on objective 
considerations. Still, the experiment faces participants with a decision whose outcomes are uncertain. Under 
this respect, the decision environment within the experiment is similar to those confronting farmers when 
they take information-based choices, such as technology and innovation adoption. An additional direction for 
further research would explore the role of leadership for behavior transmission in decision contexts with 
varying ethical and informational contents. 
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Besides its limitations and possible extensions, this research is the first to identify the effect of 
different types of naturally occurring leadership on group cooperation. Field experiments offer a unique 
opportunity to investigate long-term determinants of the voluntary provision to public goods in a natural 
environment. This experiment demonstrates that the presence of leaders can lead to improvements in group 
cooperation, especially if leadership is based on criteria relevant to group decisions and on legitimate 
selection processes. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1. Pair formation over rounds, an example 
 
 
Round 1     Round 2 
 
 
 
 
Round 3     Round 4 
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Figure 2. Contribution by absolute status, over type of authority salient 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Revision amount and lag relative giving 
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Figure 4. Within group differences in contribution 
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Table 1. Structure of session 
Decision Round Partner 
1 Private  
2-3-4 1 A 
5-6-7 2 B 
8-9-10 3 C 
11-12-13 4 D 
 
Table 2. Decision environment within rounds 
 Partner’s 
rank known 
Partner’s 
previous 
choice 
known 
Partner will 
know own 
current 
choice 
1
st
 choice of round 
Y N Y 
2
nd
 choice of round 
Y Y Y 
3
rd
 choice of round 
Y Y N 
 
Table 3. Participants’ characteristics 
      Mean Std. Dev. 
       n = 251  
 Age  41.94 [14.93] 
 Female (%)  39.84 [.49] 
 Household size  5.16 [2.11] 
 No education (%)  10.36 [.31] 
 Primary school (%)  41.83 [.49] 
 Secondary school (%)  40.64 [.49] 
 More than secondary school (%) 7.1 [.26] 
 Individual income, previous week (Pesos)   35,146 [56,397] 
 Farming main source  of income (%) 65.74 [.48] 
 Farm size (he) 2.34 [6.55] 
 Owns livestock (%)  10.44 [.31] 
 Suffered income loss due to environmental shock, previous year (%) 78.09 [.41] 
 Number of session participants who say ID is friend or relative 3.65 [3.19] 
 Number of community associations in which ID has a leadership role .339 [.60] 
 Member of ASPROCIG (%) 56.97 [.49] 
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Table 4. Correlation between rankings 
  
Formal authority 
ranking 
Moral authority 
ranking 
Traditional 
authority ranking 
Formal authority ranking 1 
  Moral authority ranking 0.351* 1 
 Traditional authority ranking 0.130* -0.149* 1.0000 
     Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1% 
 
Table 5. Characteristics correlated with status 
                 Dependent variable 
  
Formal 
authority rank 
Moral authority 
rank 
Traditional 
authority rank Average rank 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age              0.037*** 0.065*** 0.021* 0.063*** 
                 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Female           -0.774** -0.581* -0.125 -0.830*** 
                 (0.317) (0.329) (0.281) (0.281) 
Married          0.252 -0.216 -0.357 -0.178 
                 (0.346) (0.403) (0.364) (0.325) 
HH dependency ratio 0.224 0.248 -0.070 0.252 
                 (0.272) (0.195) (0.228) (0.208) 
No children in HH 0.431 -0.298 -0.313 0.021 
                 (0.504) (0.510) (0.462) (0.493) 
Primary education 1.587*** 1.039* -0.660 0.990** 
                 (0.548) (0.542) (0.589) (0.463) 
Secondary education 2.725*** 1.663*** -0.124 2.215*** 
                 (0.657) (0.595) (0.636) (0.524) 
More than secondary education 4.013*** 3.600*** -1.377 2.770*** 
                 (0.905) (0.979) (0.912) (0.828) 
HH income per capita over previous week (000 
Pesos) 0.014 0.012 0.007 0.016 
                 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Number of session participants who say ID is 
friend or relative 
0.120*** 0.183*** 0.054 0.176*** 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042) 
Number of community associations in which ID 
has a leadership role 
1.090*** 0.190 0.394* 1.029*** 
(0.313) (0.265) (0.213) (0.286) 
Member of ASPROCIG -0.624* -0.657* -0.052 -0.808** 
                 (0.354) (0.359) (0.321) (0.335) 
Session fixed-effects x x x x 
Number of Obs    251 251 251 251 
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.140 0.038 0.136 
Note: Ordered logit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Characteristics correlated with contribution 
                 Dependent variable 
                 Ci private 
Avg Ci                   
(Round 1-4) 
  (1) (2) 
Age              -28.189 -16.663 
                 (27.939) (23.112) 
Female           34.609 -0.131 
                 (657.014) (539.432) 
Married          792.991 850.110 
                 (736.237) (596.784) 
HH dependency ratio -847.703 -484.722 
                 (565.130) (530.083) 
No children in HH -1827.128* -564.614 
                 (1011.780) (826.932) 
Primary education -808.227 430.157 
                 (1220.035) (1117.748) 
Secondary education -416.414 1348.755 
                 (1422.804) (1266.919) 
More than secondary education -231.710 1031.941 
                 (1909.158) (1756.634) 
HH income per capita over previous week (000 Pesos) 17.065 25.675 
                 (23.124) (21.199) 
Number of session participants who say ID is friend or 
relative 
-57.667 50.812 
(97.889) (82.372) 
Number of community associations in which ID has a 
leadership role 
267.468 224.303 
(573.127) (516.249) 
Member of ASPROCIG 1441.665** 1452.707** 
 
(692.492) (572.798) 
Constant 675.138** 1691.230 
                 (2185.343) (1613.899) 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    251 251 
R-squared 0.293 0.409 
 Note: Linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  
 * significant at 1%. 
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Table 7. Total pair contribution by pair composition 
  Dependent variable 
                 Total pair contribution 
  (1) 
Pair features at least one leader 1694.548*** 
                 (469.787) 
Constant 6402.576*** 
                 (595.157) 
Session fixed-effects x 
Number of Obs    1791 
Number of Clusters 251 
R-squared        0.414 
        Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 8. Leadership and individual contribution 
  Dependent variable 
                 Contribution 
  (1) (2) 
Leader 1112.831** 850.697 
                 (555.550) (635.719) 
Constant 3314.099*** 2358.563* 
                 (442.800) (1422.506) 
Individual characteristics 
 
x 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    3262 3262 
Number of Clusters 251 251 
R-squared        0.278 0.301 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
   in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
   relative, and ASPROCIG membership. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 9. Higher relative status and contribution, individual fixed-effects 
  Dependent variable 
  Contribution 
                 (1) 
Higher rank 286.177** 
                 (127.168) 
Constant 6773.655*** 
                 (71.115) 
Individual fixed-effects x 
Number of Obs    3262 
R-squared        0.020 
     Note: Linear regression with fixed-effect estimator. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
     * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 10. Contribution, relative and absolute status  
  Dependent variable 
  Contribution 
                 (1) 
Higher rank 1733.036*** 
                 (414.924) 
Leader 1205.207* 
                 (727.573) 
Middle rank 623.835 
 
(551.528) 
Higher rank*Leader -1630.455*** 
                 (442.896) 
Higher rank*Middle rank -1761.525*** 
 
(463.007) 
Constant 2120.446 
                 (1396.808) 
Individual characteristics x 
Session fixed effects x 
Number of Obs    3262 
Number of Clusters 251 
R-squared        0.305 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
   parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
   in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
   relative, and ASPROCIG membership. * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 11. Contribution among non-leaders, by partner’s status 
 
  Dependent variable 
                 Contribution 
  (1) (2) 
Non-Leader -1165.471** -903.635 
                 (554.387) (633.122) 
Partner Leader -103.179 -102.798 
 
(154.774) (154.832) 
Non Leader*Partner leader 176.661 177.582 
 
(214.683) (214.948) 
Constant 4457.533*** 3239.405** 
                 (538.071) (1540.322) 
Individual characteristics 
 
x 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    3262 3262 
Number of Clusters 251 251 
R-squared        0.278 0.302 
        Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.  
        Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which i holds leadership  
        roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, and ASPROCIG membership.  
        * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 12. Total pair contribution by type of leadership salient 
 
  Dependent variable 
                 Total pair contribution 
  (1) 
Moral leadership salient 2420.960*** 
                 (601.010) 
Constant 5043.476*** 
                 (291.364) 
Session fixed-effects x 
Number of Obs    1791 
Number of Clusters 251 
R-squared        0.406 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 13. Total pair contribution over time, by pair composition 
 
  Dependent variable 
                 Total pair contribution 
  (1) (2) 
Pair features at least one leader 649.074 602.617 
                 (538.900) (540.681) 
Decision (t) -69.678 -382.337*** 
 
(45.396) (125.519) 
Pair features at least one leader*Decision (t) 114.752* 121.034* 
 
(62.103) (62.274) 
Constant 6918.722*** 10839.754*** 
                 (1196.125) (1871.020) 
Round fixed-effects 
 
x 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    3010 3010 
R-squared        0.414 0.415 
   Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
   * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 14. Contribution revision by lag relative contribution 
 
  Dependent variable 
  
Likelihood of upward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
downward revision 
  (1) (2) 
Gave more than partner in t-1 -0.154*** 0.219*** 
                 (0.031) (0.032) 
Gave less than partner in t-1 0.215*** -0.171*** 
                 (0.031) (0.032) 
Constant 0.288*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) 
Individual fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    2008 2008 
R-squared 0.122 0.126 
     Note: Linear probability fixed-effect model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
     * significant at 1%. 
  
Table 15. Leadership and contribution revision 
 
  Dependent variable 
  
Amount of 
upward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
Amount of 
downward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Leader -370.779 0.017 -115.848 0.026 
                 (225.771) (0.029) (236.724) (0.037) 
Gave less than partner in t-1 677.073*** 0.346***   
                 (204.746) (0.032)   
Leader*Gave less -17.716 -0.055   
 
(320.127) (0.051)   
Gave more than partner in t-1   2022.197*** 0.399*** 
                   (236.861) (0.031) 
Leader*Gave more   -587.138* -0.138*** 
                   (320.199) (0.050) 
Constant 793.078*** 0.232*** 335.282 0.247*** 
 
(295.595) (0.055) (276.911) (0.061) 
Session fixed-effects x x x x 
Individual controls x x x x 
Number of Obs    1288 2008 1380 2008 
Number of Clusters 251 251 251 251 
R-squared 0.081 0.094 0.154 0.117 
Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Individual 
characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which i holds leadership roles, number of 
participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner 
contribution. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 16. Higher relative status and contribution revision 
 
  Dependent variable 
  
Amount of 
upward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
Amount of 
downward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
  OLS 
Linear 
probability OLS 
Linear 
probability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Higher rank -99.662 0.004 186.167 0.039 
                 (220.488) (0.031) (218.605) (0.033) 
Gave less than partner in t-1 690.319*** 0.418***   
                 (215.031) (0.031)   
Higher rank*Gave less -250.190 -0.089**   
 
(298.650) (0.044)   
Gave more than partner in t-1   1880.184*** 0.450*** 
                   (213.109) (0.031) 
Higher rank*Gave more   -315.404 -0.086* 
                   (287.742) (0.045) 
Constant 1201.033*** 0.225*** 248.549 0.065** 
 
(150.132) (0.021) (225.197) (0.032) 
Individual fixed-effects x x x x 
Number of Obs    1288 2008 1380 2008 
R-squared 0.028 0.120 0.074 0.127 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 1%. 
 
  
Table 17. Contribution revision of non-leaders, by partner’s status 
 
  Dependent variable 
  
Amount of 
upward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
Amount of 
downward 
revision 
Likelihood of 
upward 
revision 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Partner leader -4.423 -0.016 105.589 0.035 
                 (270.791) (0.035) (251.039) (0.034) 
Gave less than partner in t-1 479.797* 0.400***   
                 (273.864) (0.038)   
Partner leader*Gave less 129.885 0.028   
 
(360.380) (0.052)   
Gave more than partner in t-1   2026.313*** 0.471*** 
                   (285.923) (0.038) 
Partner leader*Gave more   24.434 -0.009 
                   (363.435) (0.053) 
Constant 1230.815*** 0.221*** 235.728 0.047 
 
(178.563) (0.024) (280.841) (0.036) 
Individual fixed-effects x x x x 
Number of Obs    848 1344 914 1344 
R-squared 0.028 0.130 0.084 0.154 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 18. Within-group differences in contribution 
  Dependent variable 
  Contribution 
  Top group Middle group 
  (1) (2) 
Top half group -147.762 -634.577 
 
(597.453) (678.082) 
Constant -3069.344* 2734.291 
 
(1636.405) (2490.071) 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Individual characteristics x x 
Number of Obs    664 671 
Number of Clusters 251 251 
R-squared 0.683 0.435 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
    in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
    relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner contribution.  
    * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 19. Differences in contribution between bottom half of leaders’ group  
and top half of middle group 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Contribution 
 
(1) 
Top half - Middle group 208.235 
 
(537.867) 
Constant -538.975 
 
(1768.173) 
Session fixed-effects x 
Individual characteristics x 
Number of Obs 671 
R-squared 0.576 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in  
    parentheses. Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations  
    in which i holds leadership roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or  
    relative, and ASPROCIG membership, private contribution and lag partner contribution.  
    * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Friendship networks by status 
 
  Leaders Not Leaders p-value 
Total number of friends 5.16 5.47 .398 
Number of friends in leaders’ group 2.19 2.28 .655 
Number of friends not in leaders’ group 2.96 3.19 .400 
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Table 21. Contribution and friendship networks 
 
  Dependent variable 
                 Contribution 
  (1) (2) 
Number of friends in leaders' group -17.019 -15.716 
                 (175.009) (183.417) 
Number of friends not in leaders' group -75.253 -40.363 
 
(119.041) (118.901) 
Partner is leader  -148.803 
 
 (318.702) 
Number of friends in leaders' group*Partner leader  -6.353 
 
 (104.141) 
Number of friends not in leaders' group*Partner not 
leader  -53.455 
 
 (70.273) 
Constant -1410.246 -1344.836 
                 (1422.767) (1431.204) 
Individual characteristics x x 
Session fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    1999 1999 
Number of clusters 251 251 
R-squared        0.465 0.466 
    Note: Random effect model with GLS estimator. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.  
    Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education, number of community associations in which i holds leadership  
    roles, number of participants to the session who say that i is a friend or relative, ASPROCIG membership, private contribution,  
    lag partner contribution and absolute status. * significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 22. Contribution and choice observability 
 
  Dependent variable 
                 Contribution 
                 OLS OLS 
  (1) (2) 
Choice observed 32.374 45.033 
                 (124.752) (153.026) 
Partner is leader  16.551 
 
 (192.977) 
Choice observed*Partner is leader  -37.832 
 
 (264.339) 
Constant 5964.803*** 5959.084*** 
                 (134.397) (145.875) 
Individual fixed-effects x x 
Number of Obs    2007 2007 
(Pseudo) R-squared        0.029 0.029 
Note: Linear regression fixed-effects models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 1%. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Top 5 qualities of top-ranked individuals, by ranking type 
Formal authority ranking  
Are active in the community, think about the common good 22% 
Have experience, knowledge and capacity to solve community problems  15% 
Are in good relationships with the mayor  13% 
Are leaders, influential people in the community  8% 
Are trusted, respected  8% 
Know the problems of the community  8% 
Moral authority ranking  
Speak well, have good argument, are persuasive  23% 
Are diplomatic, pacific, conciliatory  21% 
Have moral qualities: responsible, serious, honest, determined  12% 
Are in good relationships with community members  11% 
Have experience, knowledge, capacity to solve community problems  10% 
Traditional authority ranking  
Are happy and funny  24% 
Are talented, have charisma  19% 
Are extroverted and enthusiastic  15% 
They have experience and skills, know many stories  14% 
They are dynamic and creative  10% 
Note: Percentages are derived from the ratio between the number of times a certain quality was mentioned in the discussion and the 
total number of qualities mentioned. 
